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NOTES AND COMMENTS
ilization does not effect sexual drive or
ability, sex offenders subjected to steriliza-
tion would be able to indulge in criminal
acts without fear of pregnancy or of need
for contraceptives. Thus, female mental
defectives, so inclined, could engage freely
in prostitution without the fear of bear-
ing children.45 Similarly, a rapist's ability
to have intercourse is not affected by ster-
ilization and consequently, such an opera-
tion would produce only the limited bene-
fit of precluding offspring without lessen-
ing his capacity to commit illicit acts.
The legal aspects of sterilization laws
must also be re-examined. The Supreme
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut," struck
down a state statute which barred the dis-
tribution of information on birth control
devices and prohibited the use of such
45 See Landman, Sterilization-Legislation and
Decisions, 23 ILL. L. REV. 465, 469 (1922).
46 379 U.S. 926 (1965).
TELEVISING JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS-A DENIAL OF
DUE PROCESS?
The emergence of television as a major
medium of reporting judicial proceedings
has raised the issue of whether the televis-
ing of pretrial activities and the presence
of television equipment in the courtroom
constitutes an obstruction of justice. On
June 7, 1965, the United States Supreme
Court held that the televising of the crim-
inal proceedings against Billie Sol Estes
devices. The Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Douglas, found a constitutional
right of marital privacy with which the
state may not interfere. It can be argued
that an individual's right to procreate is
no less important than his right of marital
privacy. In fact, the former seems an in-
extricable component of the latter, and
thus, the state should be unable to de-
prive its citizens of their ability to pro-
create.
Compulsory sterilization laws are his-
torical mistakes. While normally the law
takes some time to utilize new scientific
achievements, in this area the courts have
continuously applied eugenic theories
which have not been fully proven. The
United States Supreme Court would prob-
ably not hesitate today to strike down ster-
ilization laws on the grounds that they
contravene the protection of the individual
afforded by the Constitution and reflect a
concept repugnant to the social conscience
of America.
was a denial of "a fair trial in a fair tri-
bunal." While the decision in Estes v.
Texas1 has settled some disputes, it has
highlighted the necessity of resolving ques-
tions still unanswered. A conflict between
the orderly administration of justice and
the historical right to a public trial pro-
vides the substance of the problems to be
solved.
1381 U.S. 532 (1965).
Knowledge of the excesses of the Eng-
lish Court of the Star Chamber, and the
French monarchy's abuse of the lettre de
cachet impelled our society to provide safe-
guards against the employment of our courts
as instruments of persecution; the public
trial is one such safeguard. In the United
States the guarantee to an accused of the
right to a public trial first appeared in a
state constitution in 1776,2 and most of the
states adopted similar constitutional pro-
visions following the ratification of the sixth
amendment to the federal constitution in
1791.3 Since the United States Supreme
Court has indicated that defendants in a
state court are entitled to a public trial, the
guarantee of the sixth amendment exists on
the state as well as on the national level.4
However, the question arises as to how
"public" the trial must be. Surely the qual-
ity of justice provided is not proportional
to the magnitude of the trial forum or the
scope of its television coverage. The pur-
pose of the public trial is not that every
member of the community should be per-
mitted to view the proceedings, but, that
the trial must be open, rather than closed,
and that persons other than "officials" may
view it. "We must take cognizance of the
fact that the constitutional right of the ac-
cused to a public trial is a privilege in-
tended for his benefit." 6 If we subordinate
the accused's interest in the public trial
2 PA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
3 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1947).
5 Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press,
33 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 1, 5 (1960).
G See Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas,
153 F. Supp. 486, 495 (W.D. Pa. 1957). "While
criminal trials are public proceedings it is doubt-
ful whether the public has anything akin to a
right of attendance at such trials. The sixth
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to that of the public, we will weaken the
power of the trial judge to promulgate
rules "to preserve order and decorum in
the courtroom, to protect the rights of par-
ties and witnesses, and generally to further
the administration of justice."7
It is within the discretion of the court
to exclude persons not directly connected
with the trial to prevent a miscarriage of
justice. The right of the trial judge to
exercise this power is unquestioned when
the courtroom is overcrowded, or if there
is the likelihood of a recital of scandalous
or indecent matters which would have a de-
moralizing effect upon the spectatorsY As
long as the judge exercises the power
within these guidelines the right to a public
trial is not impaired. The trial judge's power
to exclude the press from the courtroom
has been the focus of much dispute.10 With
the advent of television as an important as-
pect of communication, this controversial
issue has been further complicated. Signifi-
cantly, it has been pointed out that today
"there remains no doubt that the protection
of freedom of speech and press is extended
to the medium of television."11
amendment grants to the accused the privilege
of a public trial, but there is no comparable con-
stitutional grant to the public making their at-
tendance mandatory upon the court or the par-
ties." Yesawich, Television and Broadcasting
Trials, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 701, 704-05 (1952).
1 People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 63, 123 N.E.2d
769, 772 (1954).
" United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 923 (3d
Cir. 1949).
9 Id. at 922.
10 Compare Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374
(1946) and Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734, 740
(Okla. 1959) with Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331 (1946) and In re Hearings Concerning
Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 296
P.2d 465, 476 (Colo. 1956).
11Doubles, A Camera in the Courtroom, 22
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 2 (1965).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The influence which television may have
upon the trial and the juror can begin be-
fore the courtroom doors are open. The
United States Supreme Court dealt with
this problem of pretrial publicity in Rideau
v. Louisiana."' In its opinion, the Court
discussed an interview, filmed in the jail
prior to trial, in which the accused con-
fessed to having committed armed robbery,
kidnapping and murder. It appears implicit
in the decision that the Court considered
this is to be pretrial publicity carried to its
extreme and which could result only in a
prejudiced trial.
The dangers presented by the televising
of criminal proceedings are not limited to
the period before trial, but are equally ap-
parent with respect to the coverage of the
trial itself. "Television can work . . . pro-
found changes in the behavior of the people
it focuses on.' 3 Both witnesses and judges
are likely to be influenced by the presence
of television equipment in the courtroom.
Constant awareness of television cameras
may result in the impairment of a witness'
testimony.1 4 Even a judge may be dis-
tracted from his duty simply because the
temptation to play to the electorate be-
comes too great.' 5 If the trial judge were
to become nothing more than an actor, the
bench could be nothing more than a stage.
The Court in Estes confronted the prob-
lems of both trial and pretrial television
coverage. In this case, extensive pretrial
publicity had given the proceedings na-
tional notoriety and had resulted in the
"2 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
13 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 569 (1965) (con-
curring opinion).
14 See United States v. Kleinman, 107 F. Supp.
407, 408 (D.D.C. 1952).
"5 See Douglas, supra note 5, at 10.
petitioner's obtaining a change of venue.
On the day of trial, the petitioner moved
to prevent the televising and radio broad-
casting of the proceedings. A two-day hear-
ing on this motion was carried live by both
radio and television, and the final result
of these deliberations was a denial of the
motion.
Thereafter, to minimize the disruptive
effect of television at the trial, a booth was
constructed in the rear of the courtroom
within which all photographers were to re-
main with their equipment during the pro-
ceedings. Because of continual objection,
only the opening and closing arguments of
the state, the return of the jury's verdict,
and its receipt by the trial judge were tele-
vised live with sound. Later, videotaped
portions of the proceedings were telecast on
regularly-scheduled news programs.
At the conclusion of his trial, the pe-
titioner was found guilty, and on appeal
his conviction was affirmed. On writ of
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court,
in a five-to-four decision, reversed the con-
viction and held that the petitioner had
been deprived of due process of law by the
televising and broadcasting of the pretrial
proceedings and of the trial itself. The
Court, through Mr. Justice Clark, stated
that the exercise of freedom of the press
must necessarily be subject to the mainte-
nance of absolute fairness in the judicial
process. The irrelevancies which are in-
jected into the proceedings by the use of
television must be protected against be-
cause they detract from the maintenance of
this fairness.
There is, however, a basic argument to
be made in favor of television in the court-
room. With television playing an increas-
ingly important role in the field of public
information, interest has arisen as to the
educational advantages to be gained from
the televised trial. Perhaps this viewpoint
has emerged because "there is no field of
government about which the people know
so little as they do about their courts."' ' ,
And, moreover, it may be equally true that
"there is no field of government about
which they should know as much, as their
courts." It has been said that with "oppor-
tunity to know and see how an accused is
afforded due process of law" the general
public "will come to have a greater re-
spect for the principles of democracy."1 7
Nonetheless, in considering the role of
television as a medium of education, the
basic purpose of the trial must not be over-
looked. It has been observed that "a trial
is not held for public information or edu-
cation. It is held for the solemn purpose
of endeavoring to ascertain the truth .... ,,18
If it were conceded, arguendo, that the edu-
cational benefits of televised trials consti-
tuted a valid basis for permitting television
in the courtroom, we would have to con-
sider Mr. Justice Harlan's statement in
Estes:
The public's interest in viewing the trial is
likely to be engendered more by curiosity
about the personality of the well-known
figure who is the defendant ...than by
innate curiosity to learn about the work-
ings of the judicial process itself.' 9
The basic controversy remains: should
television be permitted in the courtroom?
The negative position has been taken by
the American Bar Association:
The taking of photographs in the court
16 Lyles v. State, supra note 10, at 742.
17 1d. at 747.
18 Doubles, supra note 11, at 9.
10 Estes v. Texas, supra note 13, at 594 (con-
curring opinion).
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room, during sessions of the court or re-
cesses between sessions, and the broad-
casting or televising of court proceedings
detract from the essential dignity of the
proceedings, distract participants and wit-
nesses in giving testimony, and create mis-
conceptions with respect thereto in the
mind of the public and should not be per-
mitted. 20
On the other hand it has been contended
that "television cameras are quiet and un-
obtrusive, ' 21  and "that television and
press photography can be employed with-
out the least disturbance of the proceed-
ings. .. *"22 Improvements in the methods
of mass communication have now made it
possible to film or tape an occurrence al-
most without detection. This eliminates
the problem of interruption in the court-
room procedure and distraction of trial
participants. 23  However, we should not
forget that the basic purpose of a public
trial necessarily subordinates the interests
of the public to the more fundamental
rights of the accused to a fair trial. "Free-
20 Canon 35, American Bar Association Canons
of Professional Ethics. Similarly, the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that "the
taking of photographs in the courtroom dur-
ing the progress of judicial proceedings or radio
broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the
courtroom shall not be permitted by the court."
FED. R. CRIM. P. 53.
21 5. REP. No. 725, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 100
(1951).
22 Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime
and Criminal Proceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
8-9 (1961).
23 However, the problem of undetected broad-
casting devices still remains. See In re Hearings
Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, supra note 10. If the participants in a
trial are aware that they may be subjected to
unrealized scrutiny, their reactions might be the
same as if broadcasting devices were prominently
in use.
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dom of expression can hardly carry impli-
cations that nullify the guarantees of im-
partial trials. . . .The need is great that
courts be ... allowed to do their duty. 2 4
The process of justice surely does not
exhibit a perfect stability as it presently
exists. It would appear unwise, therefore,
to inject an additional variable into the
multifarious problems already extant. That
the education of the public is a valid, in-
deed a laudable, ideal, does not, of itself,
excuse an intrusion into the normal court-
24Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 284
(1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
The right of privacy has been defined
as the individual's right to be free from
unwarranted intrusions and publicity. It is,
in essence, "the right of the individual to
be let alone."' Although the right of pri-
vacy appears to be a recently emerging
doctrine, its basis can be traced to the
laws of ancient Greece and Rome, and to
the Anglo-Saxon common law,2 whereat
1 Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890).
2 HOFSTADTER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT
OF PRIVACY IN NEW YORK 1-7 (1954); Pound,
Interests in Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343,
357 (1915). For example, subsequent to the
passage of the New York statute, the Supreme
Court of Georgia condemned the Roberson de-
room procedure. Justice can not be made
an experiment - that the televising of a
trial may not be deleterious is obviously
not a sufficient justification for the utiliza-
tion of this technique.
A great segment of respected opinion re-
jects the entree of the television camera
onto the trial scene. Moreover, the psycho-
logical effects of television coverage upon
the defendant, the judge, the jury and the
general public could vitiate the meaning of
a fair and open trial. The mere possibility
of this danger militates against television
in the courtroom at this time. The same
reasoning would reject any innovation
which might tend to jeopardize the life or
liberty of even a single accused.
protection was granted only from physical
interference with life and property. In its
development, a trend has evolved which
cision as repugnant to the ordinary concepts of
justice, and espoused a concept that there was a
distinct non-statutory right of privacy which is
capable of judicial recognition. Despite the lack
of common-law precedent or commentary as a
determinative factor, support was found for the
decision in the natural law and in the state and
federal constitutional guarantees that no person
shall be deprived of liberty. However, the use of
constitutional guarantees as a foundation for the
right has been criticized as being logically weak.
The Constitution and Bill of Rights, although
recognizing in the abstract the existence of the
right of privacy, do not allocate to each individ-
ual his specific personal rights against such an
invasion. These provisions furnish only the safe-
guards and bulwarks against governmental power.
